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Abstract 
A number of emotion theorists hold that emotions are perceptions of value. In this paper I say 
why they are wrong. I claim that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide the 
perceptual modality that is needed if the perceptual theory is to succeed (where by 
‘perceptual modality’ I mean the particular manner in which something is perceived). I argue 
that the five sensory modalities are not possible candidates for providing us with ‘emotional 
perception’. But I also say why the usual candidate offered – namely feeling or affectivity – 
does not give us the sought-after perceptual modality. I conclude that as there seems to be 
nothing else that can provide the needed perceptual modality, we should reject the perceptual 
theory of emotion.1 
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Some emotions theorists hold that emotions are perceptual experiences of value. For instance, 
it might be held that fear is a perception of dangerousness or fearsomeness and sadness the 
perception of a loss (see, de Sousa 1987, Tappolet 2005, Prinz 2004, 2006, Döring 2003, 
2009).2 Call this theory of emotion the ‘perceptual-value theory of emotion’. 
Proponents of the perceptual-value theory offer a number of considerations in support of their 
theory. In particular, it is claimed that thinking of emotions as perceptions of value enables us 
to incorporate what many find attractive about judgement theories of emotion (namely, their 
ability to assign to emotion an intentional structure and for that reason allow emotions to be 
possible objects of rational evaluation), while at the same time avoid some objections that 
have been raised against judgement theories. For instance, a criticism made often of the 
judgement theory is that it seems possible, even commonplace, for people to undergo an 
emotion (say, fear) while actively refusing to endorse the judgment that the judgment theorist 
believes identifies that emotion (say, a judgement regarding the presence of danger). 
Perceptual-value theorists claim that they can avoid that problem, however, because they seek 
to identify emotion with perception, not judgement, and point out that there is no incoherency 
in holding that a person can perceive something to be one way while judging it to be another, 
as the Müller-Lyer illusion illustrates (on this point, see Faucher and Tappolet 2006, Goldie 
2009, Döring 2009).3 
I will not discuss each of the considerations that perceptual-value theorists think lend support 
to their theory of emotion. However, I will say why emotions are not experiences of value. I 
will argue that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide us with the perceptual 
modality that is needed if the perceptual-value theory of emotion is to succeed. By 
‘perceptual modality’ I mean the particular manner or mode in which the representational or 
intentional content of an experience is perceptually represented (where ‘representational or 
intentional content’ just means the way in which the world is presented in mind: for further 
discussion, see Crane 2007, Chalmers 2004). So, for example, when I see a red apple in front 
of me I represent the content of my experience – namely, there being a red apple in front of 
me– in a visual way; hence seeing (or, in other words, perceptually representing something in 
a visual manner) counts as a bona-fide perceptual modality. In what follows I argue that the 
five sensory modalities (seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and touching) are not possible 
candidates for providing us with ‘emotional perception’. But moreover, I say why the usual 
candidate offered by perceptual-value theorists – namely ‘feeling’ or ‘affectivity’– does not 
give us the sought-after perceptual modality. I conclude that as there seems to be nothing else 
that can provide perceptual theorists with the perceptual modality they need, we should reject 
the perceptual-value theory of emotion. 
2 
Consider the claim that each emotion involves at least one of the five sensory modalities. For 
example, fear might be identified with seeing or hearing something as dangerous or 
fearsome, and disgust with smelling or tasting something as repulsive. Now, there is no doubt 
that sensory experiences are often a source of emotion. The mere sight of a snake, for 
instance, can arouse fear or terror in many. It also seems noncontroversial to hold that 
emotions can cause us to have particular sensory experiences. For example, fear might cause 
objects to look or sound menacing or sinister. But it is clear that emotions are not themselves 
to be viewed as sensory experiences, and this for the following reasons. 
To begin with, whereas emotions are normally caused by other mental states, sensory 
experiences are not brought about in this way. For instance, although we will usually feel fear 
in response to particular thoughts or perceptual experiences (say, the sight of a snake), visual 
and auditory experiences never have thoughts and other mental states as their causal 
antecedents. Instead sensory experiences are normally caused directly by the things they 
represent. So, for example, a visual experience of a red object will normally be a direct 
response to the red object that is perceived (on this point, see also Prinz 2004, pp. 229–230). 
And I take it that even in the case of hallucination, where the object perceived cannot be 
responsible for the sensory experience undergone, that experience will still have as its cause 
something other than a mental state (for instance, a malfunctioning of the relevant perceptual 
mechanism). A second reason for not viewing emotions as sensory experiences is that such a 
view implies that people who fail to possess the relevant sensory modalities cannot be 
subjects of the emotion in question, and that is obviously false. For instance, many people 
who are blind and deaf can still undergo fear, and disgust can be undergone even if one has 
no sense of smell or taste.4 The third and most decisive reason for rejecting the current way of 
thinking about emotion is that such a view of emotion does not describe correctly the 
phenomenology or experience of emotion, or, in other words, the way in which our emotions 
appear or present themselves to us. What it is like to undergo fear or anger, for instance, is 
nothing like what it is to have a visual experience of any sort. Neither is undergoing fear or 
anger anything like having any other type of sensory experience, including auditory or tactile 
experiences. Crucially, and we will return to this point shortly, emotions manifest a feeling 
quality that is palpably lacking in the case of sensory experience. Emotion theorists from 
William James onwards often voice this sort of phenomenological complaint in respect of 
judgement theories of emotion, but it is one that can be brought to bear with as much force 
against attempts to assimilate emotion with sensory experience. 
Consequently, the perceptual modality involved in the case of emotion cannot be any of the 
five sensory modalities. The most commonly cited candidate for the perceptual modality 
involved in the case of emotion is feeling or affectivity – where this will be taken to mean 
that when we undergo emotion we represent evaluative properties to ourselves by means of 
feeling (and not seeing or hearing, say). The thesis that emotional feelings provide us with 
‘emotional perception’ is currently a popular thesis in the philosophy of emotion (see, for 
instance, Prinz 2004, 2005, 2006, Döring 2006, 2009). So, given its popularity (and given 
also that it is not at all clear what other than feeling could be proposed to possess the role of a 
perceptual modality) in the remainder of this paper I will critically evaluate that thesis. In 
what remains of this section I say why that thesis is to be rejected, and then, in the next 
section, I answer two responses that might be made to my rejection of that thesis. 
It has already been explained why we should accept the view that emotions comprise (types 
of) feelings. Such a view describes the phenomenology of emotion properly.5 So, for 
instance, fear manifests a distinctive ‘edgy’ quality, and anger manifests a distinctive 
‘irritable’ or ‘incensed’ quality. And it is worth pointing out that the first two objections made 
to the thesis that emotions are to be identified with sensory experiences have no force in 
respect of the claim that emotions comprise feelings. Thus, there is no reason to deny that 
emotional feelings are normally elicited by mental states. Nor is there any reason to deny that 
people who fail to possess one or more of the five sensory modalities can undergo these 
feelings. Indeed I think it would be false to deny either of those things. 
So, why is it the case that emotional feelings cannot provide us with the perceptual modality 
that is needed if the perceptual-value theory is to succeed? The reason for holding this is that 
although emotions comprise feelings, these feelings do not manifest phenomenally a 
representational character or content, including (and for our purposes especially) the sort of 
representational content the perceptual-value theorist is after. So, for instance, the 
representation of there being a dangerous (or fearsome) object in front of me is no part of the 
experience of the unpleasant edgy sensation that pervades my guts and limbs when I am 
frightened, or the representation of a slight or an offence is no part of what it is like to 
undergo the incensed or irritable feeling that is present in the emotion of anger. 
The feelings that emotions comprise might be compared with bona-fide mental 
representational states, including thoughts and sensory experiences, which do present 
themselves to us as possessing intentional or representational content. So, for example, the 
occurrent thought that cats are animals manifests phenomenally the intentional content that 
cats are animals. Similarly, a representation of an apple in front of me is very much part of 
the phenomenology of my visual experience of an apple in front of me; that is to say, that 
visual experience of mine phenomenally presents itself to be representing an apple in front of 
me (cf. Siewert 1998, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Chalmers 20046, Pitt 2004, Crane 2007). 
And it would be no good to hold that in the case of ‘emotional perception’ the content is 
represented non-conceptually, where ‘non-conceptual content’ just means representational 
content that does not require or involve the deployment of concepts. This is because even in 
cases where a mental state represents its content non-conceptually the representational 
content of that mental state will still manifest itself phenomenally (on this point, see also 
Davies 1992, Crane 2007). This is evident when we consider the case of colour experiences. 
For instance, although a visual experience of an object's redness seems to involve no 
deployment of concepts that experience still presents itself to us as being a representation of 
an object's redness. Indeed, it is only because that experience presents itself in this way to us 
that we are able to evaluate that experience for its accuracy. This is because when we attend 
to a visual experience for the purpose of assessing it for its accuracy we have to attend to how 
that experience manifests itself to us (after all there is nothing else to which we can attend). 
But then that visual experience must manifest an intentional or representational structure, as it 
is only mental states with such a structure that can be evaluated for their accuracy. Therefore, 
even if the perceptual theorist holds that emotions represent their content non-conceptually 
(as many perceptual-value theorists do hold: see, for instance, Döring 2009, Faucher and 
Tappolet 2006) that is no defence to the objection that emotional feelings are not experiences 
of value because that is not how those feelings present themselves to us phenomenologically.7 
3 
There are two ways in which the perceptual-value theorist of emotion might try to respond to 
my claim that emotional feelings do not have (the sought-after) representational content, and, 
therefore, cannot provide us with the required perceptual modality. They might hold that I fail 
to describe the phenomenology correctly, or they might object that just because emotional 
feelings do not have the appearance of possessing representational content it does not follow 
that they do not have such content. Let us consider each response in turn. 
3.1. To begin with, it might be held that I have failed to describe the phenomenology 
correctly, that, in other words, it is part of our experience of the feelings that emotions 
comprise, that they have the sought-after representational content or structure. There are two 
ways in which someone might attempt to argue that point. 
First, it might be held that careful attention to particular salient cases reveals the 
representational content of the feelings that emotions comprise. So, consider, for example, the 
agreeable or pleasurable sensation that I undergo on realising that it was I who built a 
particular house. Such a feeling, it might be held, manifests a distinctive ‘smug’ or ‘self-
satisfied’ quality, and that quality, it seems, is inextricably tied up with a particular 
representation, namely (in this case) the representation of it being I who built the house. If 
that is so, we seem to have a counter-example to the claim that emotional feelings do not 
present themselves to us as having representational properties or content. 
Now, in response, we can agree that when a person undergoes a pleasurable sensation on 
realising it was they who built a house they can be described as being smug. Moreover, we 
can accept that that smugness embodies a mental representation of it being them who built 
the house. We can also allow, for the sake of discussion, that the smugness undergone might 
include a positive evaluation of something done, say, a positive evaluation of the house that 
has been built.8 However, such an example does not demonstrate that emotional feelings 
present phenomenally as having representational content. And this is because the example is 
being used in a way that confuses the phenomenology of the feeling with that of a compound 
mental state or episode of which the feeling is only a constituent. In other words, my 
smugness (and its associated representational character) attaches to the complex mental 
episode that comprises a pleasurable feeling along with the mental representation that arouses 
that feeling (namely, the realisation it was I who built the house, or the realisation that I have 
built a good house), and not to the pleasurable feeling itself that is only a component of that 
compound mental episode. The agreeable or pleasurable sensation undergone does not itself 
manifest a smug (and the associated representational) character at all; indeed it presents only 
as a non-representational feeling state. And of course a very similar story is likely to be told 
with respect to other examples that might be offered in support of the view that emotional 
feelings have representational content. 
The second reason why it might be held I am wrong to claim that emotional feelings do not 
have the sought-after representational content, is that it might be alleged I am failing to 
consider the right sorts of feelings. Thus it might be held that I am thinking only about the 
bodily feelings that help constitute the emotions – for instance, the sensation of ‘visceral 
stirrings’ in the case of fear (see James 1884, Prinz 2004) – whereas the feelings that interest 
the perceptual-value theorist have very different properties, including the sought-after 
representational properties (cp. Goldie 2009). 
It is still not entirely clear to me how the feelings that help compose the emotions are to be 
classified (although for phenomenological reasons I think they are not simply to be identified 
with other kinds of feelings or sensations).9 However, I reject the claim that I am considering 
the wrong (sorts of) feelings when I argue that emotional feelings do not have the sought-
after representational or intentional properties. And this is because the only feelings that are 
phenomenally manifest in the emotions are the feelings I have been describing in this paper. 
So, for instance, the ‘restless’ or ‘nervous’ sensation I undergo just before a dentist 
appointment (say) is the only feeling that a state of nervousness presents as having, and the 
unpleasant edgy sensation I undergo when afraid is the only feeling phenomenally manifest 
in a state of fear (which is not to deny that at the time of being afraid or nervous I may 
undergo other emotions and their associated feelings as well). And my argument has been 
that these feelings – the only feelings manifest in the emotions – do not have the 
representational properties that the perceptual-value theorist is after. 
3.2. The second way the perceptual-value theorist might respond to my claim that feelings do 
not have the sought-after representational content is by holding that even if no intentional 
content is phenomenally manifest in emotional feeling that does not mean that such a feeling 
is not representational. There are two ways someone might argue this point. 
To begin with, it might be held that even if no representational content is phenomenally 
manifest in an emotional feeling that does not mean that such a feeling is not representational 
because we cannot derive the nature of a mental state just from its appearance. Thus, it might 
be argued, perhaps in the case of emotional feelings the phenomenology gets it wrong; 
perhaps emotional feelings do represent the world in particular ways, even if that is not 
evidenced by how they present to us in experience. 
The question, then, is what justifies inferring the nature of an emotional feeling from its 
appearance. One response would be to hold that although a thing's appearance does not entail 
logically that that thing is as it appears, it does normally provide us with prima facie grounds 
for holding that the thing is as it appears. That an object appears red, for instance, usually 
gives us grounds for holding that the object is red. Of course, it is possible the appearance is 
wrong, but unless (and until) we have enough evidence for thinking it is wrong, we are 
normally justified in holding that the object is as it appears. Similarly, it might be held that 
although the appearance of an emotional feeling does not entail logically its nature is as it 
appears, it does at least provide us with grounds for holding that the feeling is as it appears, 
and, therefore, barring the presence of defeaters, we are justified in holding that feelings have 
a non-representational structure if that is how they appear phenomenally. 
But it would be surprising (and somewhat disappointing) if this were the best that an 
argument based on phenomenology could hope to achieve. In particular, such an achievement 
could not explain the sentiment that many have that an adequate description of our mental 
lives will necessarily be faithful to the phenomenology. Fortunately, in the case of emotional 
feelings and other conscious mental states we are able to make the much stronger claim that 
in their case we can infer logically their nature from how they appear. And this is because in 
the case of a phenomenally conscious mental state there can be no gap between the mental 
state's appearance and the actual nature or composition of that mental state.10 Colin McGinn 
makes this point with regards to physical pains and tickles (thus, as he points out, how pain 
presents itself – its painful appearance, in other words – is indistinguishable from the pain 
itself: McGinn 2004, pp. 35–37 see also Kripke 1980, pp. 148–155), but the point generalises 
to other conscious mental states, including the feelings that are components of the emotions.11 
So, for instance, I think the way in which the feeling associated with fear manifests itself – its 
edgy or fearful appearance, in other words – is indistinguishable from the feeling itself. Now, 
if this is right, we can hold that in the case of emotional feelings the phenomenology is to be 
trusted because to describe accurately the phenomenology of those feelings is to describe 
accurately the nature of those mental states. 
The second reason why it might be objected that I have failed to demonstrate that emotional 
feelings do not have the sought-after intentional or representational content is as follows. 
Someone might accept that the nature or composition of an emotional feeling cannot be 
distinguished from its appearance, but continue to hold that emotional feelings have the 
sought-after representational content on the grounds that representational or intentional 
content is not something that is constitutive of a mental state and, therefore, is not a property 
that would be phenomenally manifest in a mental state. This seems to be the implication of 
Jesse Prinz's teleosemantic perceptual-value theory of emotion, for instance, which holds that 
emotions are feeling states that represent ‘core relational themes’ (that is, properties that bear 
on our vital interests) by virtue of being caused by, or naturally selected to be caused by, 
those properties (Prinz 2004, 2006). So, in Prinz's view, fear represents the property of 
dangerousness by virtue of having evolved to be caused by that property (2004, pp. 68–69). 
Now, if intentional content is a function of a causal relation holding between a feeling and the 
thing represented by the feeling, then intentional content will be no part of the feeling itself, 
and, therefore, not a property that is manifest phenomenally in the feeling. 
In response, we might accept there is one sense of ‘represent’ in which something represents 
its cause. This is the sense of ‘represent’ that is intended when we say X means or entails Y 
by virtue of being caused by Y. Call this sense of ‘represent’‘represent1’. Thus, we can say 
that thunder ‘represents1’ (=means) lightning by virtue of being caused by lightning, and 
footprints represent1 an intruder by virtue of being caused by an intruder. And with respect to 
represent1 we might even allow (or at least consider it a serious hypothesis) that the feelings 
that help compose the emotions represent1 (or at least should represent1) particular properties, 
including, the ‘core relational themes’. However, this does not demonstrate that those 
feelings have intentional or representational content (and therefore does not demonstrate that 
feelings ‘represent’ properties in the sense of ‘represent’ that the perceptual-value theorist 
seeks, which I will call ‘represent2’), and this for three reasons. 
First, represent1 cannot be the same as represent2 because whereas represent1 is ubiquitous, 
represent2 is possessed only by mental states and certain human artefacts, such as pictures 
and thermometers (on this point, see Strawson 2008, pp. 284–291).12 Represent1 is ubiquitous 
because for X to represent1 Y is just a matter of X being caused by Y, but, of course, it then 
follows that everything represents1 some other thing because everything is causally 
instantiated by some other thing (cp. Strawson 2008). And it does not help much to insist that 
intentional or representational content comes into play only when something has evolved to 
be caused by (hence, represent1) some other thing. Although this would help to limit the 
amount of intentionality in the world, it would still give us far too much of it. For instance, it 
would entail that all biological processes and behaviours (including the behaviour of 
individual cells and their subparts) have intentional properties (cp. Strawson 2008, pp. 289–
290). 
Second, whereas represent1 does not pick out a property of a mental state that is 
phenomenally manifest in the mental state (see above), the intentional or representational 
content of a mental state (or, in other words, the way in which an object is presented in mind) 
is a property of a mental state that is phenomenally manifest in a bona-fide representational 
mental state (cp. Siewert 1998, Horgan and Tienson 2002, Chalmers 2004, Pitt 2004, Crane 
2007, Strawson 2008). Thus, the intentional content that something is dangerous is a property 
that is manifest in the thought that something is dangerous, and the representation of a red 
object in front of me is very much part of the phenomenology of a visual experience of a red 
object in front of me (cp. Chalmers 2004, p. 157). And note that this is the case however the 
causal history of a mental representation is described. That the thought that something is 
dangerous has been caused by danger or a blow to the head will make no difference to the 
appearance of that thought; for whatever its cause that thought will manifest the intentional or 
representational content that something is dangerous. [And, of course, it will not help to insist 
that emotional feelings have representational or intentional content because they evolved to 
be caused by (hence, represent1) particular properties, as that also is not a property that could 
be manifest in the feelings themselves]. 
The third reason (entailed logically by the second one just given) is that whereas represent1 
does not pick out a property that is of the nature of, or composes, the mental state in question, 
the intentional or representational content of a mental state does help compose the mental 
state in question. Represent1 cannot help compose the mental state in question because 
represent1 is a function only of a causal relation holding between the mental state and the 
thing that it represents1 and, as Hume saw, causes are logically distinct from the things that 
they cause. But the intentional or representational content of a bona-fide representational 
mental state is very much part of the mental state in question. Thus the intentional content 
that something is dangerous is constitutive of my thought that something is dangerous, and 
the intentional or representational content of a red object in front of me is very much part of 
my visual experience of a red object in front of me.13 
There must be a fundamental metaphysical difference then, between the sense of ‘represent’ 
being referred to when we say an experience represents something in virtue of its causal 
history (represent1) and the sense of ‘represent’ being referred to when we say an experience 
has representational or intentional content (represent2). There might be a sense of ‘represent’ 
in which feelings ‘represent’ (or have the function of representing1) core relational themes, 
but, for the reasons just discussed, this fails to show that those feelings have the sought-after 
representational properties, and, therefore, fails to overturn the case for holding that those 
feelings have no such properties. 
4 
I conclude that my case against emotional feeling providing us with the needed perceptual 
modality continues to stand. Consequently, as I am unable to see what else in the case of 
emotion could provide us with a possible perceptual modality I am led to conclude also that 
the perceptual-value theory of emotion is false. Of course, this is consistent with holding that 
emotions might lead us to represent the world in particular ways (so for instance, fear might 
lead us to represent something as fearsome, and pleasure might lead us to represent things as 
being pleasurable or good), and if some form of moral projectivism is correct then our 
evaluative representations might even owe their nature to the emotions that causally generate 
them (see, for instance, Joyce 2006). But it is wrong to hold that emotions are themselves 
experiences of value. 
If it is the case that emotions are not experiences of value should we give up representational 
theories of emotion altogether? Certainly some claims argued for in this paper might lead us 
to ask whether emotions are best described as non-representational mental states. Thus if 
emotions present phenomenally as comprising feelings and if these feelings are non-
representational by nature, might it be the case that emotions just are these feelings? Whether 
or not we should conclude this will depend in large part on how we think object-directed 
mental states, such as a fear-of-a-dog or fear-of-my-falling-off-a-chair, should be treated. If 
we judge that such mental states are to be treated as emotions then clearly we will have to 
conclude that at least some emotions (namely, the object-directed ones) do have 
representational properties and, therefore, cannot be feelings only. On the other hand, if we 
judge there is good reason for holding that such mental states are not emotions, but are 
compound mental states comprising emotions AND bona-fide mental representations (say, 
the thought of a dog in the case of fear-of-a-dog), then it might be much more justified to 
hold that emotions are nothing more than the feelings they comprise (and for a defence of a 
compound view of the ‘object-directed emotions’, see Whiting 2011). 
Footnotes 
1I am grateful to Stephen McLeod and Barry Dainton for their comments on an earlier draft 
of the paper. 
2The evaluative properties different perceptual theorists think emotions represent are not 
always of the same type. For instance, whereas the property of being dangerous is a relational 
property (dangerousness = the property of posing a threat to our interests), the property of 
being fearsome is a ‘response-dependent property’ (fearsomeness = something like the 
property of meriting or making sense of a response of fear). Although differences between 
individual theorists regarding the nature of the evaluative properties are of interest, those 
differences do not bear on my critique of the perceptual theory (which seeks to show that 
emotions are not perceptions of value however the proposed evaluative content is spelt-out), 
and, therefore, will be largely over-looked in this paper. 
3For a useful summary of some of the other considerations cited in support of the perceptual-
value theory of emotion, see Goldie 2009. 
4It has been put to me that awe might be an exception to the claim that emotions can be 
caused by things other than sensory experiences, the thought being that awe is always felt in 
response to particular sensory experiences, say, the sight or sound of something that is 
beautiful or sublime. But I am unconvinced. For one thing it is not obvious that awe is an 
emotion. For another thing awe can be undergone in response to thoughts (say, the thought of 
someone achieving a great feat), not just sensory experiences. But even if there are 
exceptions to the claim that emotions can be triggered by things other than sensory 
experiences, this does not show that the emotions in question are composed of sensory 
experiences, of course. Also if there are exceptions they must be small in number, and will 
not include many emotions, including fear, sadness, and anger, that all perceptual-value 
theorists will want to include within the scope of their theory. 
5This is not to say that emotions are constituted wholly by feelings. Although that is a view 
defended by some emotion theorists (see, for instance, Prinz 2004, 2005, Whiting 2011), in 
this section and the next I am concerned only to evaluate the claim that the feeling 
components of emotions provide us with the sought-after perceptual modality, and not the 
claim that feeling is all there is to emotion. 
6David Chalmers writes: ‘It seems intuitively clear that perceptual phenomenology, by its 
very nature, involves the representation of the external world. For example, my visual 
phenomenology right now involves the representation of a computer on a desk in front of me, 
with various books and papers scattered on the desk’. (2004, p. 157) 
7A further issue is that of whether it is open for perceptual-value theorists to hold that the 
content they attribute to emotion can be represented non-conceptually. For instance, it seems 
likely that representing something to be dangerous (or, in other words, as posing a threat to 
one's interests) will involve necessarily the deployment of concepts. Certainly for my own 
part I struggle to see what it could mean to speak of such content being represented non-
conceptually. And it does not help much to insist that the content of fear is the fearsome. For 
presumably by ‘fearsome’ we mean something like ‘meriting a response of fear’ or ‘making 
sense of a response of fear’. Thus to represent an object as fearsome is to represent the object 
as meriting (or making sense of) a response of fear. But again that looks as if it will involve 
the use of concepts (including that of ‘meriting’ or ‘making sense of’). 
8Although I will not argue for the claim here it is not evident that a feeling of smugness 
necessarily includes a positive evaluation. Thus, in respect of the example given it seems to 
me that what I am smug about need not be the (evaluative) fact that I have done a good job 
building a house, but merely the (non-evaluative) fact that it was I who built it. But as 
nothing important rests on this in so far as my response to the present defence of the 
perceptual-value theory of emotion is concerned, I am happy to allow that a state of smugness 
might manifest an evaluative nature. 
9Crucially emotional feelings seem to occupy what David Rosenthal has called a different 
‘phenomenological location’ from other sorts of feelings (1983, p. 184). Thus whereas other 
feelings relate us only to the body (or parts of the body) emotional feelings seem to be 
experienced as belonging to the self (on this point cf. Descartes' remark that emotional 
feelings, but not other feelings, are felt ‘as though they were in the soul itself’ (1955: I, 25; 
cited in Stocker 1983, p. 7). 
10This is not to say we can never be mistaken about the appearance of a conscious mental 
state, of course. It is entirely consistent with holding that there is no gap between the 
appearance of a mental state and its nature that we might describe the appearance incorrectly. 
There is no claim to introspective infallibility into the nature of mind being made here, then. 
11Also cf. Pitt: ‘There are no conditions under which an orange after-image does not look 
orange; and there are no conditions under which a painful sensation does not feel 
painful . . . [Since] there is no distinction between a conscious mental particular and the 
experience of it, the question of the relation between the way a conscious mental particular 
appears and the way it is has only one possible answer: the way it appears is the way it is.’ 
(2004, p. 12) 
12But on the topic of the intentionality of artefacts, see fn. 13. 
13This is just to say that bona-fide mental representational states, including thoughts and 
perceptual experiences, have ‘original intentionality’, that is to say, intentional properties that 
inhere in, or are intrinsic to (or in other words, constitute) the mental state in question. 
[Original intentionality is often contrasted with ‘derived intentionality’, of course, which is 
supposed to be the sort of intentionality that physical artefacts, such as maps and fire-alarms, 
possess (cp. Searle 1984). But careful thought casts doubt on whether derived intentionality is 
a genuine form of intentionality, and not just a matter of our projecting intentional properties 
on physical objects, or our talking as if such objects have intentional properties (cp. Dennett 
1987, Strawson 2008). Thus, considered in themselves, it is far from clear whether the lines 
on a map, for instance, or the noises emitted from fire-alarms, have any intentional properties. 
If they do not, then although talk about such objects having intentional properties is harmless 
as a façon de parler, we must avoid attaching any metaphysical weight to it]. 
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